We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battle…elds. An agent's vector of battle…eld valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in L p -space.
Introduction
In a Colonel Blotto game, …nitely many agents (parties in a military con ‡ict, say) simultaneously allocate their limited resources to a given set of battle-…elds. The agent that deploys the largest amount of the resource to a given battle…eld wins in that battle…eld. Moreover, each agent's payo¤ depends on the set of battle…elds won. This type of game has been among the …rst games seriously studied in the literature (Borel, 1921; Borel and Ville, 1938) , and has since found widespread application in military theory, political economy, and security analysis, for instance (cf. Roberson, 2010) .
In this paper, we introduce a new class of N -player Colonel Blotto games with (N + 1) battle…elds and multidimensional incomplete information regarding battle…eld valuations. We assume that valuation vectors are private information and independently distributed across agents. Only the joint distribution of valuation vectors is common knowledge. Each agent maximizes the expected sum of valuations of battle…elds won, where resource budgets are …xed and homogeneous across agents, and where unused resources do not create any positive value. In this framework, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent's resource allocation to a battle…eld is strictly monotone increasing in her valuation of that battle…eld. The construction of equilibria for more than two agents relies on a new method. Speci…cally, we exploit the particular properties of uniform distributions on generalized spheres in …nite-dimensional vector spaces equipped with an L p -norm. The necessary mathematical background will be reviewed in Section 2.
He constructed explicit examples using the Generalized Gamma Distribution, the uniform distribution on a three-dimensional Eucidean ball, and the uniform distribution on a three-dimensional volume bounded by two Euclidean spheres of di¤erent radius. The present paper goes beyond Akyol's (2014) The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the necessary background on uniform spherical distributions. The set-up is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 contains the equilibrium analysis. The issue of information rents is discussed in Section 5. An extension to network games is considered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
L p -norm uniform distributions
The results of this section are essentially well-known in the mathematical literature. We will follow the exposition in Song and Gupta (1997). 6 For an integer n 3, and a real parameter p > 0, we consider Euclidean 5 There are a number of less closely related papers. Powell (2007) studied a signaling game with private information about vulnerability. Paarporn et al. (2019) assumed onesided incomplete information in a Colonel Blotto game with a …nite state space. Finally, in a model of price setting with menu costs for multiproduct …rms, Alvarez and Lippi (2014) made use of the marginals of a uniform distribution on a higher-dimensional Euclidean sphere that represents a vector of price changes. They, however, studied the problem of a monopolist, i.e., there is no Colonel Blotto game. 6 A helpful overview is given in the recent paper by Ahmadi-Javid and Moeini (2019), even though we caution the reader that their de…nition of the uniform distribution on the generalized sphere as a conditional probability measure on a set of measure zero might be subject to the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox. Another recent contribution in this literature is Richter (2019). n-space equipped with the L p -norm kyk p = (jy 1 j p + : : : + jy n j p ) 1=p (y 2 R n ).
(1)
The generalized sphere S n 1 p is de…ned as the subset S n 1 p = f(y 1 ; y 2 ; : : : ; y n ) 2 R n : kyk p = 1g
(2) of vectors of L p -norm one in R n . Provided that p > 1, which will be assumed below, the set S n 1 p is a smooth (n 1)-dimensional submanifold embedded in R n . 7 Figure 1 illustrates this property for the case where n = p = 3. To construct a uniform distribution on S n 1 p , we de…ne a particular L p -norm spherical distribution on R n and consider its projection to the generalized sphere. Let X = (X 1 ; : : : ; X n ),
where the components X j are i.i.d. random variables with p.d.f.
with (:) denoting the Gamma function. Let U j = X j = kXk p , where j = 1; : : : ; n. Then, P n j=1 jU j j p = 1, and the joint distribution of the vector
is known as the L p -norm uniform distribution. For p = 2, this probability distribution corresponds to the uniform distribution on the Euclidean unit sphere. We have the following result.
Lemma 1 (Song and Gupta, 1997) . The joint p.d.f. of U = (U 1 ; : : : ; U n ) is given by
( 1 < u j < 1; j = 1; 2; : : : ; n 1;
Proof. See Song and Gupta (1997, Theorem 1.1).
Since the spherical distribution is multidimensional, it is of interest to know if a stochastic representation in terms of simpler distributions exists. In addition to the de…nition in terms of a collection of independent one-dimensional exponential distributions, stochastic representations may be derived from a collection of independent one-dimensional uniform distributions, and from a Dirichlet distribution (which may be decomposed using Beta distributions).
For further details, we refer the reader to Song and Gupta (1997, Theorem 2.1, part (2) and (3)).
The marginal distribution of the j-th component U j may be determined using the Jacobi integral formula. The corresponding calculation leads to the following result.
Lemma 2 (Song and Gupta, 1997) . The univariate marginal density of g with respect to any of the components u 1 ; : : : ; u n is given as
n 1 p 1 ( j = 1; : : : ; n; 1 < u j < 1). (7) In particular, if p = n 1, then the univariate marginal is uniform.
Proof. See Song and Gupta (1997, Theorem 2.1, part (1)) for k = 1.
For example, in the special case where n = 3 and p = 2, the marginal density of the j's component U j is given as
hence constant, so that the marginal distribution is uniform on [ 1; 1]. This special case of Lemma 2 has been used by Kovenock and Roberson (2011) .
Below, we will exploit Lemma 2 more generally.
Set-up
There are N 2 risk-neutral agents, denoted by i 2 f1; : : : ; N g, and (N + 1) battle…elds, denoted by j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g. 8 Each agent is endowed with an identical budget of a perfectly divisible resource. For convenience, we normalize budgets to one. An agent's resource allocation is a vector
where b j 2 R + = [0; 1) denotes the amount of the resource allocated to battle…eld j. We call a resource allocation b = (b 1 ; : :
Denote by B N +1 the set of feasible resource allocations over N + 1 battle…elds.
The N agents simultaneously and independently choose feasible resource allocations. In each battle…eld, the agent that allocates the largest amount of the resource wins. In the case of a tie, each of the agents that allocated the largest amount of the resource to a battle…eld wins in that battle…eld with equal probability. Each agent's payo¤ equals the sum of the valuations of the battle…elds won.
Agents are ex-ante identical but privately learn, before deciding about the resource allocation, their respective vector of battle…eld valuations, v = (v 1 ; v 2 ; : : : ; v N +1 ). The vector v is commonly known to be drawn, independently across agents, from a given (N + 1)-variate probability distribution.
Since, as discussed in the Introduction, a general solution of Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about valuations is presently out of reach, we will work under parametric assumptions. The type space for an agent is given as the intersection of the nonnegative orthant R N +1 + with a generalized sphere S n 1 p , where the parameters are given by n = N + 1 and p = N (cf.
Section 2). Thus,
For example, in the special case N = 2, the type space V 2 corresponds to the intersection of R 3 + with the two-dimensional Euclidean unit sphere. For general N 2, the dimension of the bordered type manifold V N is N , and the dimension of the embedding space is N + 1. It will be assumed that each agent's valuation vector v is drawn from the L p -norm uniform distribution on
The corresponding probability measure on the Borel subsets of V N will be denoted by N .
Equilibrium analysis
A pure strategy is a measurable mapping b :
When adhering to strategy b, type v's resource allocation is
Clearly, any strategy of an opponent induces a probability measure over feasible resource allocations. Therefore, given strategies for the (N 1) opponents, type v's resource allocation translates into a vector of winning probabilities, and hence, into an expected payo¤ for type v. A strategy b is called a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy in the Colonel Blotto game with incomplete information if, for any type realization v 2 V N , the resource allocation b (v) maximizes the expected payo¤ of type v under the assumption that the other (N 1) agents individually adhere to strategy b . We will say that an equilibrium strategy b is strict if each type v 2 V N even has a strict incentive to choose the resource allocation b (v).
Proposition 1. Suppose that each agent's (N + 1)-vector of battle…eld valuations is independently drawn according to the probability measure N on V N .
Then, the pure strategy b de…ned through
is a strict symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy in the Colonel Blotto game with incomplete information.
The strictness property contrasts with the case of Colonel Blotto games with complete information where Nash equilibria are typically non-strict.
Proposition 1 extends known equilibrium characterizations for Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about valuations. The analysis of Kovenock and Roberson (2011) is contained as a special case where N = 2. Akyol (2014) allowed for any …nite number of battle…elds, but restricted attention to the case of two agents. In addition, to account for his assumption that the distributions of valuation vectors are absolutely continuous, his characterization of the equilibrium strategy entails a normalization factor, which would be one in Proposition 1.
In comparison with the analysis of Adamo and Matros (2009) , who considered incomplete information about budgets, we …nd that their Corollaries 1 and 2 hold likewise in the present setting, i.e., all agents compete for all prizes, and each agent spends more on prizes she values higher. However, their Corollaries 3 and 4 do not transfer to the present setting. Indeed, there is no highest type in our setting and, as will be shown in the next section, the expected payo¤ is constant across types in our model. (1)
Pr b
(1) j max i2f2;:::
Now, for any resource allocation (b (1) 1 ; : : : ; b
(1) N +1 ) 2 B N +1 , and for any battle-…eld j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g, the independence of type distributions across agents yields Pr b
Moreover, for any i 2 f2; : : : ; N g,
Applying Lemma 2 with n = N + 1 and p = N , we see that
for any z 2 [0; 1]. Hence, F j (:) is uniform. Putting the pieces together, we …nd that Pr b
Let (v (1) ) denote the shadow cost of the budget constraint in agent 1's problem. Using the calculation above, agent 1's problem in battle…eld j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g may be written as
Note that agent 1's objective function in (17) is strictly concave since N 2.
Solving the …rst-order condition,
Clearly, in an optimal allocation, no resources remain unused, i.e.,
b
Therefore, summing Eq. (29) over all battle…elds j 2 f1; : : : ; N + 1g, we …nd that = (N 1)=N and, hence, b
Thus, it is indeed optimal for type v (1) of agent 1 to allocate the resource as prescribed by the symmetric equilibrium strategy b . Obviously, the same is true for agents i 2 f2; : : : ; N g. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
Information rents
The symmetric equilibrium strategy identi…ed above has the property that the amount of the resource deployed in any given battle…eld increases strictly in the agent's valuation of that battle…eld. Thus, the identi…ed Bayes-Nash equilibrium leads to an e¢ cient selection of battle…eld winners, just as in the symmetric single-unit all-pay auction with independent types. 9
It is noteworthy, however, that the expected payo¤ of an agent does not depend on the type realization. Indeed, using our intermediary result (26), the expected payo¤ of type v (1) 2 V N of agent 1, say, is given by
We have shown the following.
Proposition 2. In the considered class of Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information, all types realize the same expected payo¤.
Thus, in contrast to the single-unit auction, where higher types realize positive information rents as a consequence of incentive compatibility, any such bene…ts net out over battle…elds in the considered class of Colonel Blotto games. 10
Networks of Blotto games
As an extension, we consider networks of Colonel Blotto games with N K agents and (N + 1) K battle…elds, where K 1 is an integer. Each agent is restricted to be active in (N + 1) given battle…elds, and draws a type from V N . For example, any triangulation of a globe, say, may be understood as a network of Blotto games, where each triangle represents an agent, and each edge shared with a neighboring triangle represents a battle…eld. In this case, N = 2 and K 2. It is immediate to see that examples exist for any combination of N 2 and K 2. The equilibrium analysis extends in a straightforward way. Intuitively, an agent does not care whether she is facing, in any two distinct battle…elds, the same opponent or two di¤erent opponents. This is so because the marginal distribution of resource bids in each battle…eld does not depend on this.
Figure 2. Networks of Blotto games
antichain with respect to the product order on R N +1 .
Concluding remark
The methods of this paper may be used to construct also new classes of mixedstrategy equilibria in two-player Colonel Blotto games with complete information and 2(N + 1) homogeneous battle…elds. These may be understood as further generalizations of the disc solution (Borel and Ville, 1938; Gross and Wagner, 1950; Laslier and Picard, 2002; Thomas, 2018) . However, since the number of battle…elds is even, such new solutions in the case of complete information would ultimately be of limited interest, for the same reasons discussed by Laslier and Picard (2002) , viz. that agents partition battle…elds into pairs, and perfectly negatively correlate within each pair of battle…elds. 11
By combining the insights of Akyol (2014) and the result of the present paper, it seems feasible to construct additional examples involving any …nite number of agents and any …nite number of battle…elds. We leave that extension for future work.
